Explanation and epistemology

In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 413 (2002)
Authors
William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Second, there is a form of ampliative inference that has come to be called ‘inference to the best explanation,’ or more briefly ‘explanatory inference.’ Roughly: From the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the data at hand better than any other available hypothesis, we infer with some degree of confidence that that leading hypothesis is correct. There is no question but that this inference is often performed. Arguably, every human being performs it many times in a day, perhaps without letup
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Reprint years 2003
DOI 10.1093/0195130057.003.0015
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Does IBE Require a "Model" of Explanation?Frank Cabrera - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy010.
Explanation and the Nature of Scientific Knowledge.Kevin McCain - 2015 - Science & Education 24 (7-8):827-854.
Is Explanatoriness a Guide to Confirmation? A Reply to Climenhaga.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (4):581-590.
In Defense of the Explanationist Response to Skepticism.Kevin McCain - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.

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