1.Competition between philosophical theories of linguistic meaning is sometimes specious. For example, suppose Ned believes that an utterance’s meaning is its truth-condition, while Ted insists that the utterance’s meaning is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intentions à la Grice.Here one wants to distinguish explananda:What Ned is after is really the utterance’s (“timeless”) sentence-meaning; Ted is focusing on speaker-meaning, which is not the same, and the two theories are perfectly compatible, indeed mutually complementary, accounts of distinct phenomena.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Verificationist Theory of Meaning.Markus Schrenk - 2008 - In U. Windhorst, M. Binder & N. Hirowaka (eds.), Encyclopaedic Reference of Neuroscience. Springer.
Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.William G. Lycan - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
Truth-Conditional Content and Conversational Implicature.Robyn Carston - 2004 - In Claudia Bianchi (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. CSLI Publications. pp. 65--100.
Radical and Moderate Pragmatics: Does Meaning Determine Truth Conditions?Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2005 - In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
Meaning.Kent Bach - 2003 - In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads131 ( #36,749 of 2,172,903 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #36,327 of 2,172,903 )
How can I increase my downloads?