An agentive non-intentionalist theory of self-deception

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):779-798 (2017)

Authors
Kevin Lynch
Huaqiao University
Abstract
The self-deception debate often appears polarized between those who think that self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves (‘intentionalists’), and those who think that intentional actions are not significantly involved in the production of self-deceptive beliefs at all. In this paper I develop a middle position between these views, according to which self-deceivers do end up self-deceived as a result of their own intentional actions, but where the intention these actions are done with is not an intention to deceive oneself. This account thus keeps agency at the heart of self-deception, while also avoiding the paradox associated with other agency-centered views.
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2017.1321909
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References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.

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