Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons

Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362 (2013)

Authors
Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut
Abstract
In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
Keywords epistemic agency  justification  epistemic circularity  practical reasons
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12018
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:33-52.
A Permissivist Ethics of Belief.Thébert Angélique - 2017 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2).

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