Epistemic commitments, epistemic agency and practical reasons

Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?

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10.1111/phis.12018

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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
The fundamental model of deep disagreements.Victoria Lavorerio - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):416-431.
What’s so bad about echo chambers?Christopher Ranalli & Finlay Malcolm - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.

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