MIT Press (2012)

Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut
Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
Keywords Epistemology  Rationality  Skepticism
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ISBN(s) 0262017229   9780262017220  
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What is Democratic Reliability? Epistemic Theories of Democracy and the Problem of Reasonable Disagreement.Felix Gerlsbeck - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2):218-241.
Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.

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