Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408 (2004)
Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
Generic Truth and Mixed Conjunctions: Some Alternatives.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):473-479.
Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
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