Authors
Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut
Abstract
Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' argued, is immune from Davidsonian objections to the very idea of a scheme
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DOI 10.1080/00201749708602460
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Nature and Rationality of Conversion.Paul Faulkner - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):821-836.
On Davidson's Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism.Xinli Wang - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):140-164.
Relativity of Fact and Content.Michael P. Lynch - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):579-595.

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