In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), Pragmatism, Minimalism and Metaphysics (forthcoming)
Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
|Keywords||Truth deflationism value of truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2007 - In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 61--89.
What Should a Deflationist About Truth Say About Meaning?Huw Price - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:107-115.
Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth.Matthew McGrath - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth.Jeffrey Hershfield - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
Problems of Deflationism.Panu Raatikainen - 2006 - In Tuomo Aho & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (eds.), Truth and Games in Logic and Language. (Acta Philosophica Fennica vol. 78). pp. 175-185.
Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism About Truth-Aptness?Massimiliano Vignolo - 2010 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):81-98.
Added to index2012-07-13
Total downloads210 ( #18,622 of 2,164,296 )
Recent downloads (6 months)45 ( #5,722 of 2,164,296 )
How can I increase my downloads?