Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptness

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158 (2011)
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Abstract

In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.

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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
The Argument from Accidental Truth against Deflationism.Masaharu Mizumoto - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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