The truth in contextual semantics

Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):173-195 (2002)
In a series of papers written over the last two decades, Terence Horgan has articulated a radical position on truth and metaphysics that he calls contextual semantics. According to Horgan, we can abandon referentialism – or the idea that truth is always and everywhere understood in terms of the referential relations between words and world – while still sensibly believing in a mind-independent world. The centerpiece of contextual semantics is that it allows for some flexibility about truth: statements of different sorts can be true in different ways depending on the degree to which they correspond to the world. In this paper, I explore the consequences of this position.While I believe that contextual semantics has significant advantages, there is a deep tension between Horgan'stolerance of more than one kind of truth and his belief in one type of reality – a tension that threatens to undermine the entire position.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,786
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Reference, Inference and the Semantics of Pejoratives.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 137--159.
Truth as Correct Assertibility: An Intermediate Position?Tadeusz Szubka - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):157-171.
Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics.Terence Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):503-509.
The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics.Claire Horisk - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Particularist Semantic Normativity.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61.
Ontological Commitment and Contextual Semantics.Maria E. Reicher - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):141-155.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
28 ( #207,935 of 2,231,526 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #264,176 of 2,231,526 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature