Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception

Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311 (2011)
Abstract
Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
Keywords perception  encapsulation  cognitive penetration  justification  modularity  reliabilism  epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00205.x
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.

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