Experiential evidence?

Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079 (2015)
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Abstract

Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of introspection but which generalizes to theories of perceptual justification as well

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Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Unconscious Evidence.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.
Epistemological Problems of Perception.Jack Lyons - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What we talk about when we talk about epistemic justification.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):867-888.
Two dogmas of empirical justification.Jack C. Lyons - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):221-237.
The eye's mind: Perceptual process and epistemic norms.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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