Evidence, experience, and externalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):461 – 479 (2008)
The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived version of the argument does not support coherentism. Instead, I use it to argue for a strongly externalist epistemology.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400801886363
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Jack C. Lyons (2016). Experiential Evidence? Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.
Frank Hofmann (2013). Three Kinds of Reliabilism. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
Frank Hofmann (2010). Intuitions, Concepts, and Imagination. Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):529-546.

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