Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception

Episteme 13 (1):1-28 (2016)

Authors
Jack Lyons
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Abstract
Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by which experiences are evaluated. I examine recent defenses of inferentialism by Susanna Siegel, Peter Markie, and Matthew McGrath and argue that the prospects for inferentialism are dim
Keywords cognitive penetration  perception  internalism  reliabilism  justification  modularity
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1017/epi.2015.60
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References found in this work BETA

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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Citations of this work BETA

Unconscious Evidence.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262.
The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347.

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Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.

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