Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?

Abstract
The New Evil Demon Problem is supposed to show that straightforward versions of reliabilism are false: reliability is not necessary for justification after all. I argue that it does no such thing. The reliabilist can count a number of beliefs as justified even in demon worlds, others as unjustified but having positive epistemic status nonetheless. The remaining beliefs---primarily perceptual beliefs---are not, on further reflection, intuitively justified after all. The reliabilist is right to count these beliefs as unjustified in demon worlds, and it is a challenge for the internalist to be able to do so as well.
Keywords epistemology  reliabilism  perceptual justification  experiential evidence  externalism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00614.x
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Evidentialism.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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