The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability

In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos. pp. 79 (2009)
Abstract
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction.
Keywords multiple realizability  reduction  shared properties  approximation and idealization
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