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Semantics for Subjective Measures of Perceptual Experience
Frontiers in Psychology 10 (2019)
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Citations of this work
Investigating the validity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale – The effect of task-related difficulty on subjective rating.Zuzanna Skóra, Kinga Ciupińska, Simon Hviid Del Pin, Morten Overgaard & Michał Wierzchoń - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 95:103197.
What Makes Behavioral Measures of Consciousness Subjective and Direct?Jakub Jonkisz - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (4):683-700.
References found in this work
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):181-204.
The components of content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
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