A challenge to the kripke/putnam distinction between epistemic and metaphysical necessity

Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):113--128 (1997)
I argue that the account of the epistemic modalities developed by Kripke and Putnam is incomplete since it does not make use of the possible worlds machinery that is indispensable to their analysis of the metaphysical modalities. It would have been simpler and more elegant if they had used the concept of 'possible world' to explain both modalities. Instead, they provide an explication of the epistemic modalities in terms of the vague concepts of conceivability and revisability. I show that logical omniscience as a consequence of a possible worlds analysis of the epistemic modalities can be made palatable.
Keywords Epistemology, Necessity, Semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview199713232
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Two Kinds of Possibility.Dorothy Edgington - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):1–22.
Kripke on Necessity and Identity.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 27 (3):151-159.
Physical and Metaphysical Necessity.Stephen Leeds - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):458–485.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
26 ( #201,034 of 2,191,985 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #289,020 of 2,191,985 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature