A challenge to the kripke/putnam distinction between epistemic and metaphysical necessity

Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):113--128 (1997)

Authors
Brian MacPherson
University of Windsor
Abstract
I argue that the account of the epistemic modalities developed by Kripke and Putnam is incomplete since it does not make use of the possible worlds machinery that is indispensable to their analysis of the metaphysical modalities. It would have been simpler and more elegant if they had used the concept of 'possible world' to explain both modalities. Instead, they provide an explication of the epistemic modalities in terms of the vague concepts of conceivability and revisability. I show that logical omniscience as a consequence of a possible worlds analysis of the epistemic modalities can be made palatable.
Keywords Epistemology, Necessity, Semantics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/swphilreview199713232
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,328
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-06-22

Total views
31 ( #289,832 of 2,280,259 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #401,413 of 2,280,259 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature