Oxford University Press (2014)

Authors
John MacFarlane
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.
Keywords relative truth  assessment sensitivity  context sensitivity  relativism  truth
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
Buy this book $39.95 from Amazon    $54.56 used   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780199682751   0199682755   9780198776819   0198776810
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,060
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

View all 303 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
Scalar Consequentialism the Right Way.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3131-3144.
VIII—Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.
Retractions.Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3335-3359.

View all 220 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Insight and the Subject.Eric James Morelli - 2011 - International Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):137-148.
Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
Differentiating Insight From Non-Insight Problems.K. J. Gilhooly & P. Murphy - 2005 - Thinking and Reasoning 11 (3):279 – 302.
Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
The Puzzle of the Subject as Subject in Lonergan.Frederick E. Crowe - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):187-205.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-08-03

Total views
268 ( #30,634 of 2,403,696 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #50,282 of 2,403,696 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes