Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance

Authors
Penelope Mackie
Nottingham University
Abstract
Many contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility.
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246118000140
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References found in this work BETA

Agent Causation and the Problem of Luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.
Libertarianism, Luck, and Control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.
The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism.Helen Steward - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.
Libertarianism, Compatibilism, and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):1-21.

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