Diego Machuca (ed.)
Routledge (2013)
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Abstract |
Disagreement is a pervasive feature of human life whose skeptical implications have been emphasized particularly by the ancient Pyrrhonists and by contemporary moral skeptics. Although the connection between disagreement and skepticism is also a focus of analysis in the emerging and burgeoning area of epistemology concerned with the significance of controversy, it has arguably not received the full attention it deserves. The present volume explores for the first time the possible skeptical consequences of disagreement in different areas and from different perspectives, with an emphasis in the current debate over the epistemic impact of disagreement. The thirteen new essays collected here examine the Pyrrhonian approach to disagreement and its relevance to the present epistemological discussions of the topic; the relationship between disagreement and moral realism and antirealism; disagreement-based skeptical arguments in contemporary epistemology; and disagreement and the possibility of philosophical knowledge and justified belief. Given the ever-growing interest in both the significance of disagreement and the challenge of skepticism, this volume makes a new contribution by conjugating two important trends in current philosophical research.
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Keywords | Skepticism Reasoning Disagreement |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2012, 2013, 2017 |
Buy this book | $51.15 new (10% off) $56.22 used (1% off) $56.95 from Amazon Amazon page |
Call number | B837.D57 2012 |
ISBN(s) | 9780415532839 0415532833 9781138062672 1138062677 |
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The Presidential Address: Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy.Helen Beebee - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (1):1-24.
Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.
Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.
The Propagation of Suspension of Judgment. Or, Should We Confer Any Weight to Crucial Objections the Truth-Value of Which We Are Ignorant?Aldo Filomeno - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
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