Synthese 104 (1):99-122 (1995)

Cynthia Macdonald
University of Manchester
Externalism in the philosophy of mind is threatened by the view that subjects are authoritative with regard to the contents of their own intentional states. If externalism is to be reconciled with first-person authority, two issues need to be addressed: (a) how the non-evidence-based character of knowledge of one's own intentional states is compatible with ignorance of the empirical factors that individuate the contents of those states, and (b) how, given externalism, the non-evidence-based character of such knowledge could place its subject in an authoritative position. This paper endorses a standard strategy for dealing with (a). The bulk of the paper is devoted to (b). The aim is to develop an account of first-person authority for a certain class of intentional states that is capable of explaining (1) why knowledge of one's own intentional states is peculiarly authoritative, and (2) why such authority is compatible with externalism
Keywords Authority  Epistemology  Externalism  Self
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063677
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Individualism and Psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.
Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Content and Self-Knowledge.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-Knowledge and Inner Space.Cynthia Macdonald - 2006 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 73--88.
Self-Knowledge and the "Inner Eye".Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
Self-Knowledge and the 'Inner Eye'.Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
Theories of Mind and 'the Commonsense View'.Cynthia Macdonald - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (5):467-488.
Philosophy, Drama and Literature.Rick Benitez - 2010 - In Graham Oppy & Steve Gardner (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Melbourne, Australia: Monash University Press. pp. 371-372.

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Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 123-155.
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Davidson on First‐Person Authority and Externalism.Sven Bernecker - 1996 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):121-139.
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