Expertise and Intuitions about Reference

Theoria 27 (1):37-54 (2012)

Abstract

Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

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Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh

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