Oxford University Press (2006)

Authors
Penelope Mackie
Nottingham University
Abstract
A novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned metaphysicians.
Keywords modality  essentialism
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Reprint years 2009
Call number B105.E65.M33 2006
ISBN(s) 0199562407   0199272204   9780199272204   9780199562404
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.486_2.x
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Modal Science.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-492.
Modality is Not Explainable by Essence.Carlos Romero - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):121-141.
A Modal Account of Essence.Michael De - 2020 - Metaphysics 3 (1):17-32.
Identity and Indiscernibility.K. Hawley - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):101-119.
The Modal View of Essence.Sam Cowling - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):248-266.

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