How to Split Concepts: A Reply to Piccinini and Scott

Philosophy of Science 73 (4):410-418 (2006)
Abstract
In “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind” (2005), I argued that the notion of concept in psychology and in neuropsychology fails to pick out a natural kind. Piccinini and Scott (2006, in this issue) have criticized the argument I used to support this conclusion. They also proposed two alternative arguments for a similar conclusion. In this reply, I rebut Piccinini and Scott’s main objection against the argument proposed in “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind.” Moreover, I show that the two alternative arguments de- veloped by Piccinini and Scott are not promising for supporting the conclusion that concepts are not a natural kind.
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DOI 10.1086/516812
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The Plurality of Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Précis of Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):195-206.
Précis de Doing Without Concepts.Édouard Machery - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):141-152.

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Splitting Concepts.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (4):390-409.
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