If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately be united as, or in, some single conscious entity underlying the apparent plurality of individuals.
|Keywords||consciousness singular plural context|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Pursuit of Autonomy. Interdisciplinary Observations to Human Consciousness.Helmut Wautischer - unknown
Against Functionalist Theories of Consciousness.Michael V. Antony - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.
Individual Differences in Conscious Experience.Robert G. Kunzendorf & Benjamin Wallace (eds.) - 2000 - Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.
Measurement of Collective and Social Fields of Consciousness.Attila Grandpierre - 2001 - World Futures 57 (1):85-94.
The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 2: Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity.Tom R. Burns - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):166-184.
Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous?Michael V. Antony - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
Dynamic Existence.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):877-883.
Added to index2012-07-15
Total downloads311 ( #9,846 of 2,178,142 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #20,236 of 2,178,142 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There is 1 thread in this forum
Excellent paper first and foremost Mr. MacLeod! As I was reading your thoughts on plurality and the nature of the individual conscious, it made me think of the ideal of Solipsism. For those who don't know, Solipsism is defined as: The view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist. Would you say that your case for a plurality of consciousness "immediately present." defeats the ideal of a Solipsistic Philosophy?