Individual Consciousness

If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately be united as, or in, some single conscious entity underlying the apparent plurality of individuals.
Keywords consciousness  singular  plural  context
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous?Michael V. Antony - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
Plural Quantification.Øystein Linnebo - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dynamic Existence.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):877-884.
The Subjectlessness of Self-Consciousness.Edward T. Bartlett - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.


Added to PP index

Total downloads
407 ( #9,450 of 2,308,308 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #30,335 of 2,308,308 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature