Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism


Authors
Fiona Macpherson
University of Glasgow
Abstract
Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects' beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00481.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,692
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Modularity of Mind.Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.

View all 105 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Agent in Magenta.Dave Ward - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1).
Manipulating Colour: Pounding an Almond.John Campbell - 2006 - In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 31--48.
The Multiply Qualitative.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):239-262.
Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
Expert Perceivers and Perceptual Learning.Paul T. Sowden - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):396-397.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-06-26

Total views
482 ( #7,650 of 2,328,115 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #14,537 of 2,328,115 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature