Iv. moral rationality, tradition, and Aristotle: A reply to Onora O'Neill, Raimond Gaita, and Stephen R. L. Clark

O'Neill's critique of my account of Kant does point to serious inadequacies in that treatment, but I argue in reply that on some central points she is mistaken and that Kant's moral rigorism and his conception of what it is to be a rational agent are more open to the conventional objections than she allows. What needs to be put in question is the whole nature of rational justification in morality, for justification always in fact requires the context of a tradition. In confronting Gaita's criticisms of my views on the relationship of moral philosophy to morality and of the teleological aspect of the virtues the relevant notion of tradition is further elaborated in a way that provides premises both for a response to Clark's defense of Moore and for an indication of how the social analysis of modernity in After Virtue might be defended
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DOI 10.1080/00201748308602010
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Ii. Virtues, Human Good, and the Unity of a Life.Raimond Gaita - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):407 – 424.
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