Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth

Philosophical Review 111 (3):462-465 (2002)

Abstract
The aim of this short book is to discuss the traditional topics of philosophical logic without the “formalistic fetishism and scholasticism” that McGinn associates with recent work in the field. The writing is indeed crisp, engaging, and free of formalisms. The book consists of five separate essays—one each on identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth—loosely united by the general theme that these “logical properties” are real and irreducible. “These concepts,” McGinn says, “form a conceptual bedrock; they stand, as it were, underneath all our other concepts. They have no analysis”.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0031-8108
DOI 10.1215/00318108-111-3-462
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
On Saying That.Donald Davidson - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.

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Citations of this work BETA

Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
Predication and Extensionalization.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
The Things We Do with Identity.Alexis Burgess - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):105-128.
Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut

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