Levelling reduction

Abstract

Argues in favor of a mechanism approach to understanding (at least some) science and scientific explanation. Criticizes current models of reduction, becuase they fail to be able to include activities, which do much of the explanatory work in mechanisms, and the assumpotions of reductive models about discrete levels is seriously fatal. Uses LTP research as an example.

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