Making sense of relative truth

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339 (2005)
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to make sense of relativism about truth. There are two key ideas. (1) To be a relativist about truth is to allow that a sentence or proposition might be assessment-sensitive: that is, its truth value might vary with the context of assessment as well as the context of use. (2) Making sense of relativism is a matter of understanding what it would be to commit oneself to the truth of an assessment-sensitive sentence or proposition.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00116.x
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Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
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Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):121-142.
Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement.Carl Baker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
The Evidence for Relativism.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Synthese 166 (2):375-395.

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