Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66 (2003)

Authors
Fiona Macpherson
University of Glasgow
Abstract
I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation
Keywords Color  Content  Epistemology  Experience  Representation
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00162
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What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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