Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters — A note

Theory and Decision 39 (2):207-211 (1995)
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Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed



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|N| cheers for democracy.I. D. A. MacIntyre - 2002 - Synthese 131 (2):259 - 274.

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