Theory and Decision 39 (2):207-211 (1995)

Abstract
Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed
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DOI 10.1007/BF01078985
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The Pareto Rule and Strategic Voting.Ian MacIntyre - 1991 - Theory and Decision 31 (1):1-19.

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