Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation

Blackwell (1995)
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Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Individualism  Knowledge  Psychology  Science
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Call number BF38.P474 1995
ISBN(s) 0631185410     0631185429
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No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535–579.
The Properties of Mental Causation.David Robb - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):221-226.

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Two Kinds of Laws.Ned Block - 1994 - In C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Supervenient Causation.Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald - 1995 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 4-28.
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