Phenomenal Presence
Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.)
Oxford University Press (2018)
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| Abstract |
What kinds of features of the world figure consciously in our perceptual experience? Colours and shapes are uncontroversial; but what about volumes, natural kinds, reasons for belief, existences, relations? Eleven new essays investigate different kinds of phenomenal presence.
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| ISBN(s) | 9780199666416 |
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