Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
AbstractWhat kinds of features of the world figure consciously in our perceptual experience? Colours and shapes are uncontroversial; but what about volumes, natural kinds, reasons for belief, existences, relations? Eleven new essays investigate different kinds of phenomenal presence.
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A modal analysis of phenomenal intentionality: horizonality and object-directed phenomenal presence.Kyle Banick - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10903-10922.
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