Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality

Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32 (1991)
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Abstract

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function.

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References found in this work

Morals by Agreement.Richmond Campbell - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):343-364.
Morality and advantage.David P. Gauthier - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (4):460-475.
Some paradoxes of deterrence.Gregory S. Kavka - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (6):285-302.

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