Relativism and disagreement

Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31 (2007)
Abstract
The relativist's central objection to contextualism is that it fails to account for the disagreement we perceive in discourse about "subjective" matters, such as whether stewed prunes are delicious. If we are to adjudicate between contextualism and relativism, then, we must first get clear about what it is for two people to disagree. This question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. A partial answer is given here; although it is incomplete, it does help shape what the relativist must say if she is to do better than the contextualist in securing genuine disagreement
Keywords relativism   disagreement
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9049-9
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

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Citations of this work BETA
Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
Disagreements About Taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.
Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142.

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