Robot pains and corporate feelings

The Philosophers' Magazine 52 (52):78-82 (2011)
Abstract
Most philosophers of mind follow Thomas Nagel and hold that subjective experiences are characterised by the fact that there is “something it is like” to have them. Philosophers of mind have sometimes speculated that ordinary people endorse, perhaps implicitly, this conception of subjective experiences. Some recent findings cast doubt on this view.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1354-814X
DOI 10.5840/tpm20115216
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