The Philosophers' Magazine 52 (52):78-82 (2011)

Authors
Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
Justin Sytsma
Victoria University of Wellington
Abstract
Most philosophers of mind follow Thomas Nagel and hold that subjective experiences are characterised by the fact that there is “something it is like” to have them. Philosophers of mind have sometimes speculated that ordinary people endorse, perhaps implicitly, this conception of subjective experiences. Some recent findings cast doubt on this view.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 1354-814X
DOI 10.5840/tpm20115216
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,251
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Unfelt pain.Kevin Reuter & Justin Sytsma - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1777-1801.
Experimental Philosophy of Pain.Justin Sytsma & Kevin Reuter - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):611-628.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
Why Machines Can Neither Think nor Feel.Douglas C. Long - 1994 - In Dale W. Jamieson (ed.), Language, Mind and Art. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Pains and Pain-Feelings.Eddy M. Zemach - 1971 - Ratio (Misc.) 13 (December):150-157.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant.David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
There is No 'I' in 'Robot': Robots and Utilitarianism (Expanded & Revised).Christopher Grau - 2011 - In Susan Anderson & Michael Anderson (eds.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 451.
What Feelings Can't Do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-12-02

Total views
69 ( #146,486 of 2,419,589 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #542,199 of 2,419,589 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes