The Philosophers' Magazine 52 (52):78-82 (2011)
Most philosophers of mind follow Thomas Nagel and hold that subjective experiences are characterised by the fact that there is “something it is like” to have them. Philosophers of mind have sometimes speculated that ordinary people endorse, perhaps implicitly, this conception of subjective experiences. Some recent findings cast doubt on this view.
|Keywords||Applied Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
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