Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz

Mind and Language 25 (5):634-646 (2010)
In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo-empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of ‘concept’ because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long-term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01406.x
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