Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt

Theoria 27 (2):223-227 (2012)
In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.
Keywords reference  expertise  semantic intuitions  semantic epistemology
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DOI 10.1387/theoria.6223
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