Analytic Philosophy 56 (2):177-187 (2015)

It is generally thought that suspension of judgment about a proposition p is the doxastic attitude one is rationally compelled to adopt whenever the epistemic reasons for and against p are equipollent or equally credible, that is, whenever the total body of available evidence bearing on p epistemically justifies neither belief nor disbelief in p. However, in a recent contribution to this journal, Jan Wieland proposes “to broaden the conditions for suspension, and argue that it is rational to suspend belief on a certain issue even if one’s current evidence is not neutral (or even close to neutral)”. My aim in this paper is to point to a number of problems in Wieland’s position, some of which in connection with the account of Pyrrhonian skepticism found in the extant works of Sextus Empiricus.
Keywords skepticism  rationality  suspension  equipollence  inquiry
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12060
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References found in this work BETA

Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism.Julia Annas & Jonathan Barnes (eds.) - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
The Pyrrhonian Argument From Possible Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2011 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):148-161.
Pyrrhonism, Inquiry, and Rationality.Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 34 (1):201-228.

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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.

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