Striving for truth in the practice of mathematics: Kant and Frege

Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):65-92 (2007)
My aim is to understand the practice of mathematics in a way that sheds light on the fact that it is at once a priori and capable of extending our knowledge. The account that is sketched draws first on the idea, derived from Kant, that a calculation or demonstration can yield new knowledge in virtue of the fact that the system of signs it employs involves primitive parts that combine into wholes that are themselves parts of larger wholes. Because wholes such as numerals and Euclidean figures both have parts and are parts of larger wholes, their parts can be recombined into new wholes in ways that enable extensions of our knowledge. I show that sentences of Frege 's Begriffsschrift can also be read as involving three such levels of articulation; because they have these three levels, we can understand in essentially the same way how a proof from concepts alone can extend our knowledge
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