Shoemaker on self-knowledge and inner sense

What is introspective knowledge of one's own intentional states like? This paper aims to make plausible the view that certain cases of self-knowledge, namely the cogito-type ones, are enough like perception to count as cases of quasi-observation. To this end it considers the highly influential arguments developed by Sydney Shoemaker in his recent Royce Lectures. These present the most formidable challenge to the view that certain cases of self-knowledge are quasi-observational and so deserve detailed examination. Shoemaker's arguments are directed against two models of ordinary perception, the "object perception model" and the "broad perceptual model". I argue that the core theses that Shoemaker associated with them are either dubious in their own right or applicable to certain cases of self-knowledge. Overall the aim is to show that there is such a variety of patterns in each case that simple analogies or disanalogies are unhelpful
Keywords Epistemology  Internal  Self-knowledge  Sense  Shoemaker, S
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DOI 10.2307/2653791
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Robert J. Howell (2010). Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):459-483.

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