Philosophy of Science 46 (4):501-532 (1979)
In place of earlier instrumentalist and phenomenalist interpretations of science both Quine and Sellars have developed highly influential realist positions centering around the doctrine that accepting a theory as explanatory and irreducible rationally entails accepting the entities posited by the theory. A growing reaction against this realism is partially based on perceived inadequacies in the doctrines of Quine and Sellars, but even more on reconstructions of scientific explanations which do not involve such ontic commitments. Three types of anti-realistic positions are considered and criticized. Hesse's neo-Duhemian position couples a statistical theory of inference to a downgrading of purely theoretical statements. Sneed uses the method of axiomatrization through set-theoretic predicates to supply a reconstruction of Kuhn's account of scientific development. Here Ramsey-reduction sentences serve to eliminate purely theoretical terms. The longest section deals with van Fraassen's semantic model based on a state-space representation of scientific theories and the use of this model in interpreting quantum mechanics. It is argued that the model is valuable, but that the anti-realist interpretation accorded it is not justified and entails serious inconsistencies
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Models and Methodologies in Current Theoretical High-Energy Physics.James T. Cushing - 1982 - Synthese 50 (1):5 - 101.
Hierarchy Versus Holism: A Structuralist View on General Relativity. [REVIEW]Thomas Bartelborth - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (3):383 - 412.
Bibliography of Structuralism II (1989–1994 and Additions).Andoni Ibarra, Thomas Mormann & Werner Diederich - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):403-418.
Schwinger and the Ontology of Quantum Field Theory.Edward MacKinnon - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (4):295-323.
Similar books and articles
Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell.Jacob Busch - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.
Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism?Mohamed Elsamahi - 1994 - In David & Richard Hull & Burian (ed.), PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. pp. 173 - 180.
Constructive Empiricism and Anti-Realism.Sam Mitchell - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:174 - 180.
Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification.Jeffrey Ketland - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms.Pierre Cruse - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
Confirmation and the Indispensability of Mathematics to Science.Susan Vineberg - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):263.
Relativism and Our Warrant for Scientific Theories.Paul Faulkner - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):259 – 269.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads211 ( #17,845 of 2,154,159 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #398,005 of 2,154,159 )
How can I increase my downloads?