Journal of Philosophy 118 (6):320-342 (2021)

Authors
William MacAskill
Oxford University
Caspar Oesterheld
Duke University
Aron Vallinder
Forethought Foundation
Abstract
Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one's bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than another, and the credences you assign to each of these theories are not very different, then it is appropriate to choose the option that performs best on the high-stakes theory. Second, we show that, given the assumption of altruism, the existence of correlated decision makers will increase the stakes for EDT but leave the stakes for CDT unaffected. Together these two claims imply that whenever there are sufficiently many correlated agents, the appropriate response is to act in accordance with EDT.
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DOI 10.5840/jphil2021118622
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
Running Risks Morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.

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