Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):315–324 (2006)
Julia Annas has affirmed that the kind of modern moral skepticism which denies the existence of objective moral values rests upon a contrast between morality and some other system of beliefs about the world which is not called into doubt. Richard Bett, on the other hand, has argued that the existence of such a contrast is not a necessary condition for espousing that kind of moral skepticism. My purpose in this paper is to show that Bett fails to make a good case against Annas’ thesis. To accomplish this, it will be helpful to consider the Pyrrhonean attitude towards morality as expounded in Sextus Empiricus’ work.
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References found in this work BETA
On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts.Richard T. Garner - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):137 – 146.
Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed.M. F. Burnyeat - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):3-40.
Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Black - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:65 - 82.
The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics.Malcolm Schofield & Gisela Striker (eds.) - 1986 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.
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