Transcending Turing computability

Minds and Machines 13 (1):3-22 (2003)

Abstract
It has been argued that neural networks and other forms of analog computation may transcend the limits of Turing-machine computation; proofs have been offered on both sides, subject to differing assumptions. In this article I argue that the important comparisons between the two models of computation are not so much mathematical as epistemological. The Turing-machine model makes assumptions about information representation and processing that are badly matched to the realities of natural computation (information representation and processing in or inspired by natural systems). This points to the need for new models of computation addressing issues orthogonal to those that have occupied the traditional theory of computation.
Keywords Computation  Information  Logic  Representation  Turing Machines
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1021397712328
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References found in this work BETA

The Sciences of the Artificial.Herbert A. Simon - 1969 - [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.
The Emperor's New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Languages of Art.Nelson Goodman - 1968 - Bobbs-Merrill.
On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.

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Gretchenfragen an den Naturalisten.Gerhard Vollmer - 2012 - Philosophia Naturalis 49 (2):239-291.

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