In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion. Oxford University Press (2011)
To assert something is to perform a certain kind of act. This act is different in kind both from other speech acts, like questions, requests, commands, promises, and apologies, and from acts that are not speech acts, like toast buttering and inarticulate yodeling. My question, then is this: what features of an act qualify it as an assertion, and not one of these other kinds of act? To focus on a particular example: in uttering “Bill will close the window,” one might be practicing English pronunciation, asserting that Bill will close the window, or requesting that Bill close the window. What makes it the case that one is doing one of these and not another?
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):615-635.
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics1.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.
Similar books and articles
Acts of Requesting in Dynamic Logic of Knowledge and Obligation.Tomoyuki Yamada - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (2):59-82.
Assertion and Grounding: A Theory of Assertion for Constructive Type Theory.Maria Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):187-210.
Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States.Mitchell S. Green - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
The Status of the Knowledge Account of Assertion.Frank Hindriks - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
Biscuit Conditionals: Quantification Over Potential Literal Acts. [REVIEW]Muffy E. A. Siegel - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (2):167 - 203.
Added to index2009-09-11
Total downloads151 ( #29,161 of 2,143,564 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #43,297 of 2,143,564 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.