Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):153 – 168 (1986)
AbstractPatricia Churchland's Neurophilosophy argues for Eliminative Materialism, but it is vulnerable to criticism under the following heads: (1) It fails to offer a satisfactory account of the subjective quality of experience, and misinterprets arguments by Nagel and Jackson on subjectivity. (2) Its treatment of intentionality results in a most implausible denial of the immediate ?aboutness? of thoughts, and the view of the mental as essentially what it is interpreted to be cannot be sustained. (3) The attempt to counter the argument that logical relations between the content of mental states cannot be reduced to causal relations obtaining at the level of neurobiology is unsuccessful. (4) The view that the prepositional attitudes of common?sense psychology are seriously flawed is not made out, and the claims that ?folk? psychology constitutes a theory, and one which could and ought to be eliminated, are both self?defeating
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References found in this work
Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States.Paul M. Churchland - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen Stich - 1982 - In a Woodfield (ed.), Philosophical Review. MIT Press. pp. 418-421.
Citations of this work
Where Does the Self‐Refutation Objection Take Us?William Ramsey - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):453-65.
Physicalism and the Content of Thought.Geoffrey C. Madell - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):107-21.
Ramsey on Eliminativism and Self‐Refutation.Victor Reppert - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):499-508.