A principled sceptic's response


Patricia Churchland's Neurophilosophy argues for Eliminative Materialism, but it is vulnerable to criticism under the following heads: (1) It fails to offer a satisfactory account of the subjective quality of experience, and misinterprets arguments by Nagel and Jackson on subjectivity. (2) Its treatment of intentionality results in a most implausible denial of the immediate ?aboutness? of thoughts, and the view of the mental as essentially what it is interpreted to be cannot be sustained. (3) The attempt to counter the argument that logical relations between the content of mental states cannot be reduced to causal relations obtaining at the level of neurobiology is unsuccessful. (4) The view that the prepositional attitudes of common?sense psychology are seriously flawed is not made out, and the claims that ?folk? psychology constitutes a theory, and one which could and ought to be eliminated, are both self?defeating

Download options


    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,660

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

25 (#460,582)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Similar books and articles

Mental Fictionalism.Meg Wallace - 2022 - In Tamas Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. Routledge. pp. 27-51.
Folk Psychology as Theory or Practice? The Case for Eliminative Materialism.John M. Preston - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (September):277-303.
Intertheoretic Relations and the Future of Psychology.Robert N. McCauley - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (June):179-99.
Zhuangzi and Relativistic Scepticism.Ewing Y. Chinn - 1997 - Asian Philosophy 7 (3):207 – 220.
The Value of Hope.Luc Bovens - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):667-681.
Neurophilosophy: A Principled Skeptic's Response.Geoffrey C. Madell - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (June):153-168.

References found in this work

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.

Add more references

Citations of this work

Where Does the Self‐Refutation Objection Take Us?William Ramsey - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):453-65.
Physicalism and the Content of Thought.Geoffrey C. Madell - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):107-21.
Ramsey on Eliminativism and Self‐Refutation.Victor Reppert - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):499-508.

Add more citations