Intention and the Self

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):325-351 (2011)
Abstract
Does intention presuppose personal identity, and what relevance does the issue have for the contemporary personal identity debate? I distinguish three ways in which intention might be said to presuppose personal identity, focusing mainly on causal presupposition and content presupposition. I argue that intention often causally presupposes personal identity. I argue that intention does not content-presuppose personal identity. The former result is a potential basis for a Butlerian circularity objection to Lockean theories of personal identity. The latter result undercuts a prominent Lockean reply to ‘the thinking animal’ objection which has recently supplanted traditional Butlerian circularity objections in the personal identity debate
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00313.x
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References found in this work BETA
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.

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